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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

7 March 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A General Review of Modern Military Doctrine

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article undertakes a review of military doctrine as seen from the Soviet Ground Forces viewpoint. The author notes that his colleagues do not yet understand that a future conventional war would be conducted under the constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons. He also alludes to the possibility that there will be an intermediate phase involving selective use of nuclear weapons. Soviet tactical rocket forces are said to have recently received conventional warheads and rockets with a range of 1000 kilometers. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (89) for 1970.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): New Questions of Operational Art at Its Present Stage of Development

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Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (89) for 1970 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Leytenant F. Gayvoronskiy. This article undertakes a review of military doctrine as seen from the Soviet Ground Forces viewpoint. The author notes that his colleagues do not yet understand that a future conventional war would be conducted under the constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons. He also alludes to the possibility that there will be an intermediate phase involving ~~selective~~ limited use of nuclear weapons. Soviet tactical rocket forces are said to have recently received conventional warheads and rockets with a range of 1000 kilometers.

End of Summary

[redacted] Comment:

Gen.-Lt. Fedor Filippovich Gayvoronskiy was a Department Chief on the General Staff in 1965 when he accompanied Marshal Malinovskiy on an official trip to Austria. Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past -- TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version is published three times annually and is distributed down to the level of division commander. [redacted]

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New Questions of Operational Art at Its Present Stage of Development

by

General-Leytenant F. Gayvoronskiy

In recent years, substantial qualitative changes have taken place in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces and in the armed forces of the enemy, changes which have called into being a whole series of new tasks and problems in the development of the theory of operational art as a science. In the present article, only a few of these will be reviewed: ①achievement of a unified point of view in the preparation of operations (combat actions) for accomplishing tasks under various conditions of the initiation and conduct of war; ②questions of the preparation of a departure position prior to the start of military actions; ③methods of routing enemy groupings under various conditions of the start of a war; ④conduct of operations with limited use of nuclear weapons; and several others.

In recent years, a lively discussion of these questions and others has been carried on in the press and at military-scientific theoretical conferences in military districts, fleets, and academies. A study of published materials shows that they are still far from having a unified point of view on all questions.

On achieving unification in the preparation of initial operations (combat) actions, for accomplishing tasks under the various conditions of the possible start of a war. It is very important under present conditions to conduct comprehensive research and to substantiate the possible nature of the initial operations (combat actions) of formations of various branches of the armed forces and, in connection with this, to determine the most advisable way to prepare these operations (combat actions) and to establish groupings of troops, forces and means capable of accomplishing tasks under any conditions of the possible start of a future war.

The experience of past wars indicates that the success of initial operations is to a large extent predetermined by correctly defining the tasks of operational formations and the nature of their actions from the start of a war. It is sufficient to recall what serious consequences for our country were brought about by the incorrect conclusions of our military-theoretical thinking regarding the content and nature of combat actions at the start of a war. In our prewar theory, as is known, it was assumed that in the initial period we would conduct combat actions with covering troops and would fight for supremacy in the air, while, at the same time, carrying out the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the main forces. It was for just such operations that our border military districts were prepared. Actually, from the very beginning of the war, the Soviet Armed Forces were faced with the necessity of repulsing the invasion of enormous masses of troops of fascist Germany and its satellites.

Under present conditions, errors in working out the problems of entering into a war and in preparing the initial operations can lead to even more serious consequences.

The preparation of present-day operations, as never before, must be based on the thorough analysis and scientific anticipation of the probable ways for the start of a war, with close attention to the developing situation, its possible changes, and the anticipated results of the combat actions of the troops. The plans for initial operations must be highly flexible, to allow for the successful initiation and conduct of combat actions both using nuclear weapons and using conventional weapons without requiring appreciable changes in the tasks and operational structure of troops, forces and means, and to make it possible to shift rapidly from one type of actions to the other depending on how the situation develops.

In order to accomplish tasks successfully under conditions when military actions begin with the use of nuclear weapons, it is necessary, first of all, to maintain the rocket troops and aviation at a high state of readiness to mount an initial nuclear strike. This strike must be planned and prepared with particular care. For actions under such conditions, troops must be prepared to move forward from their points of deployment within minimum

periods of time, to conceal their personnel, weapons and equipment (in order to preserve their combat effectiveness), and to take the offensive. The situation will change sharply after both sides have delivered nuclear strikes. For this reason it does not seem possible during peacetime to make detailed plans for the actions of troops following initial nuclear strikes. These plans will be refined simultaneously with the restoration of combat effectiveness of the troops, forces and means and the elimination of the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes. For the successful conduct of combat actions in case of the start of a non-nuclear war, the grouping of troops, forces and means and the sequence of their actions in fulfilling the tasks of the operation must be precisely determined.

The enemy, in preparing a non-nuclear attack, will strive to establish strong strike groupings and superiority along the axes of the strikes and to exploit the element of surprise. It is therefore necessary that troops be trained in advance not only for the successful conduct of combat operations against a defending enemy but also for skilfully routing enemy forces in meeting engagements and in repulsing enemy invasions into our territory.

Under any conditions of the initiation and conduct of combat operations in non-nuclear warfare, attainment of success requires air superiority and air support of the actions of one's troops. It is therefore necessary in any situation to combat enemy aviation in the air and to have a strong antiaircraft defense.

For accomplishing tasks with and without the use of nuclear weapons, the following question in the theory of operational art has become the most critical: how to define our tasks and to plan the initial operations (combat actions) of the operational formations of the branches of the armed forces on the assumption that they may be conducted under fundamentally differing conditions--with or without the use of nuclear weapons. Some comrades propose setting the tasks of operational formations and large units separately--taking into consideration the use of nuclear or conventional weapons--and working out, accordingly, two initial plans, on the justification that it is very difficult in actual practice to plan methods of actions of troops which differ fundamentally. These comrades are

totally unable--as Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov points out--to assimilate the obvious truth that the threat of using nuclear weapons in operations is now constant and it is already impossible not to take this into consideration. And once this has become so, it follows that operations must always be planned with consideration of this threat. Only unified planning--Comrade Zakharov says further--assures continuity in troop operations during abrupt changes in the situation, including during a surprise transition from conventional to nuclear weapons.

One must also take into account that the initial operations (combat actions) are prepared during peacetime, when there is no concrete information on the possible way the aggressor may begin the war. Inasmuch as it doesn't seem possible to set up groupings of forces and means on the assumption that some specific types of war will be conducted, the tasks of the troops, the forces and means and the system of control must be flexible enough to successfully operate under any conditions, without complicated regroupings and losses of time in refining variants for actions. This is answered to the greatest degree by a situation in which the goals of the operations (combat actions), the zones of actions and the tasks of operational formations and large units in them will be one and the same for the various conditions of the start of war.

Unquestionably it is very complicated to determine in advance the grouping of troops, forces and means in a departure position prior to the start of military actions which would be capable of successfully accomplishing tasks in a fundamentally varying situation. At the same time, this question requires a detailed solution. As is known, in an operation using nuclear weapons, the rout of enemy groupings to the full depth of the deployment of his forces, including nuclear weapons, is achieved mainly by using nuclear weapons. To ensure the success of actions of troops, forces and means under such conditions, the rocket troops and aviation must be in constant readiness to deliver nuclear strikes. To achieve this, we must continuously refine: the targets for destruction in the first massive strike by nuclear and chemical warheads; the quantity and yield of these warheads for each target; the types of nuclear bursts and the time of readiness for launches of missiles; the time periods for the preparation and supply of

missiles and nuclear warheads; and the sequence and time periods for deployment of rocket troops before the start of an operation and for redeploying them during the operation. With the entry of missiles with conventional warheads into the armament of the rocket troops, naturally, it will be required to define the tasks for their use in case a war begins without the use of nuclear weapons. In assigning tasks to artillery, it is necessary to indicate its grouping, the procedure for conducting preparatory fire and fire support of advancing troops, and the tasks to be carried out during the operation, with or without the use of nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons are used, it is not necessary to establish any significant superiority over the enemy in artillery, aviation, tanks, and motorized infantry, and have great densities of these means along the axes of the planned strikes. If it is necessary to accomplish tasks with only conventional means of destruction, on the contrary, substantial densities and superiority in them over the enemy are required. In this there lies the fundamental complexity of determining the initial grouping of the troops of a front.

In our view, in establishing groupings of troops of fronts and armies and in determining their tasks one must proceed not only from the need to successfully rout the enemy with the use of nuclear weapons but also to create such conditions that our troops will be prepared to fulfil their assigned tasks with only conventional means of destruction. Because of this they will be required to have a specific composition of forces and means.

As wartime experience and research show, in planning combat actions without the use of nuclear weapons, the operational calculation unit must be the motorized rifle (tank) division, which can advance in a zone twenty kilometers wide and break through a defense in a sector up to four kilometers wide. The immediate task of a division of the first echelon in breaking through a prepared defense can be seizing the positions of the brigade (regimental) reserves of the enemy to a depth of ten to ~~fifteen~~ kilometers; the subsequent task--destroying division reserves and seizing lines to a depth of twenty to thirty kilometers. If it is planned to break through a weakly prepared enemy defense or to rout his troops in a meeting engagement, the depth of the tasks of divisions of the first

echelon can be increased to fifty kilometers. In a number of instances, these tasks can be assigned even under conditions of the start of an operation with the use of nuclear weapons, but the time periods for their accomplishment will be different, since in such an instance the troops will obviously be able to advance at faster rates.

Both in the nuclear and in the non-nuclear variant of operations, in order to reduce the possibility of destruction of strike groupings by nuclear weapons, one must disperse the troops in the departure position, shelter personnel and equipment in structures with a reliable degree of protection, and strictly implement camouflage requirements. All of these measures must be worked out in the troops, taking into account, first of all, that a war can start with the massive use of nuclear weapons by both sides and also suddenly, with the calculation of repulsing a potential enemy invasion. There will, of course, be specific differences between the nature and quantity of measures taken prior to the start of military actions and those taken during the course of the actions. If actions without the use of nuclear weapons are required, troops can be concentrated in the breakthrough sectors in the course of moving forward for attack, for the purpose of fulfilling the task of rapidly widening the front of the breakthrough on the flanks and in depth.

In accordance with the nature of the start of an operation, one will be required to review the matter of establishing air groupings capable of successfully accomplishing the tasks of an air operation for routing enemy air strike forces and supporting our advancing troops.

All of this once again confirms the conclusion that it is necessary to work out a unified plan of an operation, which would provide for the optimal variant for use of available forces and means to fulfil the tasks and attain the objectives of the operation with or without the use of nuclear weapons. In our opinion, further improvement in the matters of planning an operation (combat actions and preparing troops, forces and means) should be made in that direction.*

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* Further detail on this matter is given in an article by General-Mayor N. Reut published in this Collection of Articles.

What may be the content of the plan of an operation and in how much detail must this or that be reflected in the plan? Under present-day conditions, it will be required to plan in detail the initial nuclear strike, measures providing for the survivability of the troops and for the sequence of their actions with or without the use of nuclear weapons, and also measures for all types of support and control of troops. An initial nuclear strike is planned according to targets and tasks. At the present time, in connection with the entry into the armament of missiles with a range of up to 1000 kilometers, it becomes possible to plan the destruction of the most important targets to the full depth of a front operation, including tasks of disrupting the mobilization and operational deployment of the forces of the enemy. For successful accomplishment of tasks by the troops after nuclear strikes, measures are worked out in detail for ensuring the survivability of forces and means, for restoring the combat effectiveness of the troops, and for a strategic advance of the troops into the depth of enemy territory.

In the event of the start of an operation without the use of nuclear weapons, the plan provides for the sequence of use of forces and means for accomplishing the tasks under these conditions. In principle, the tasks (immediate and subsequent) of the front and army can remain the same for various conditions of the start of a war, and the axes of advance of the troops will also be the same. The time limits and the sequence of fulfilment of the tasks change.

On preparing a departure position before the start of military actions. It must be recognized that up to now, since the entrance of nuclear weapons into the arsenal, insufficient attention has been devoted to this problem, since it has been thought that the troops will go over to the offensive after an initial strike or during the strike, moving forward from the points of deployment or from waiting areas and deploying for attack, as a rule, from the march. Without disclaiming such conditions for transition to the offensive, we would want to emphasize that if only this variant is acknowledged, insufficient consideration is being given to the possibility of sudden enemy attack and his invasion into our territory.

In our view, in order to increase the survivability of the troops in the event nuclear weapons are used, to create favorable conditions for repulsing an enemy attack, and to ensure organized transition to the offensive under all possible variants of the start of a war, it is necessary to plan in detail and prepare in advance the departure position of the troops, forces and means, especially as regards engineer preparation.

Defensive actions of our troops at the beginning of World War II showed that those large units of border military districts which had not been able to prepare the planned defense lines and occupy them prior to the start of combat actions, were forced to go into combat from the march, in a situation unfavorable to them. And under present-day conditions troops brought to full combat readiness but not deployed on lines prepared in advance can meet with great difficulties.

The departure position of the troops must be prepared in advance, proceeding from the tasks assigned to the formation (large unit), and with consideration for providing stability during the repulse of an enemy invasion and the maximum degree of protection against weapons of mass destruction. The troops in the departure position will be moved forward in accordance with the situation, with consideration for ensuring the attainment of surprise. Understandably, it is advisable to prepare most fully from the engineer standpoint areas along the probable axes of enemy strikes. Here we must prepare, in essence, a deeply echeloned defense, with a well-developed system of positions and lines.

Particular care will be required in preparing: the departure position of divisions of the first echelon; the positions of rocket troops, artillery, and antiaircraft defense troops; the basing areas of the aviation; the dispositions of the reserves; command posts; and the system of communications. For each of the divisions of the first echelon it is desirable to prepare: two or three defensive positions; deployment areas for the rocket battalion, artillery, and antiaircraft missile units; and accommodation areas for the second echelons, the reserves, command posts, and other elements of the combat structure of the division. All of these will, in essence, constitute the first zone of

defense. It is most advisable to choose its forward edge with consideration for not giving the enemy opportunities to hit our troops with the fire of the main mass of his artillery and for reducing the effectiveness of his use of tactical nuclear weapons. One must also take into consideration, in choosing the forward edge of the first zone, that there must be prepared in front of it: positions for combat security (covering) units, engineer obstacles, and deployment areas for the artillery and rocket battalions of the divisions which are earmarked for supporting the security units in combat and for conducting fire during the transition to the offensive.

In the departure position of the second echelon and the reserves of the front (army), it is necessary to prepare concentration areas, lines of possible deployment for counterstrikes, and routes out of them and to the state border. These areas can form the second zone of defense, or, on some axes, the third zone of defense.

For the rocket troops and antiaircraft defense troops of the front and armies, there are prepared primary and alternate deployment areas; for the aviation--concealed dirt airfields in addition to the primary airfields. Also prepared in advance are: accommodation areas for reserves of special troops; command posts; routes for maneuvering, bringing up material means, and evacuation; and zones and sectors of obstacles and demolitions.

Of course, during such preparation of the departure position of the troops, it is necessary to carry out a great amount of work, especially in the deployment areas of the divisions of the first echelon. In this connection a question arises as to the time required for carrying out these measures.

We believe that such measures as the following can be taken in advance: procurement of engineer structures and bringing them up to the departure areas; preparation of command posts, ammunition dumps, and deployment areas for the duty forces; reconnaissance; and study of routes, sectors (zones), and the nature of the fulfilment of engineer work. The major volume of the engineer work can apparently be fulfilled in the period of a situation of growing tension and after the troops have moved forward into

their departure areas. Calculations show that if each unit (large unit) will assign half of its personnel and seventy-five percent of its earthmoving equipment to preparing its sector (zone, area), the departure areas can be prepared in the following time periods: in the division--eight or nine days; in the army--ten to eleven days; and in the front--twelve to fourteen days. In doing so, in each area there will be preparation of primary and alternate emplacements for all fire means, dugouts for sixty percent of the personnel and shelters for the other forty percent, and shelters for seventy percent of the special and transport vehicles. This sort of engineer preparation of the departure areas, if they are occupied in time, will reduce the degree of destruction of troops by nuclear weapons in comparison with an exposed disposition by a factor of ten for personnel and by a factor of two for all types of equipment.

Of course, the movement forward of troops into departure areas and the preparation of the areas can be done only on order of the Supreme High Command. The task of operational art lies in thorough research of these problems from all angles, working them out, and validation.

On methods of routing enemy groupings. Up to the present time this problem has been mostly worked out for the conditions of conducting operations with unlimited use of nuclear weapons as the main means of destroying the enemy. It has been less worked out for other conditions of conducting operations. In a non-nuclear war and in operations starting without the use of nuclear weapons, the role of operational formations in accomplishing the tasks of a strategic operation in a theater of military operations, and the methods of conducting operations (combat actions) and of routing enemy groupings, will differ sharply from the conditions of nuclear warfare. When nuclear weapons are not used, front formations will become the decisive force acting on the enemy in ground theaters, while in sea theaters it will be fleets in joint action with long-range aviation.

In routing the enemy on land, the role and importance of aviation will increase substantially. The amount of its tasks, especially in combatting enemy aircraft, antiaircraft defense means, command posts, and reserves will rise sharply. In doing so, the actions of aviation will take

place under more complicated conditions, since the enemy's antiaircraft defense system (if nuclear strikes are not delivered against it) will be sufficiently vital and stable. Strong action against the enemy's deep rear and reserves will not be provided, since the use of strategic missiles is excluded and the use of long-range aviation in conjunction with having to overcome strong antiaircraft defenses apparently will not produce the required effect.

As regards the other front means of destruction, they have the range and capabilities to ensure only the destruction of enemy troops of the first echelon and, in part, the nearest reserves. In this connection, under the stated conditions, the methods and time limits for fulfilling tasks and, above all, for the conduct of operations (combat actions) and the rout of enemy groupings, can be completely different. Therefore, along with improving the methods of conducting operations using nuclear weapons, operational art is carefully researching and working out the problems of conducting operations with only the use of conventional means of destruction. This is of very great importance for training the troops and staffs at the present stage of development.

Under present-day conditions, conduct of an offensive operation of a front without the use of nuclear weapons can be carried out by striking along one or more axes to split the enemy troops into separate isolated groupings and to destroy them in detail or by striking along converging axes to surround the enemy's main forces and destroy them, at the same time developing an offensive in depth to seize the areas where the goal of the operation will be achieved. Either way, the destruction of enemy groupings can be achieved by massing artillery fire and aviation strikes, by breaking through the enemy defense, or by routing him in a meeting engagement and then developing an advance in depth and toward the flanks. Surrounding the enemy and destroying his main groupings will be done by forces of the front alone or in cooperation with neighboring fronts.

During an offensive on a coastal axis under conditions of strong enemy action from a coastal area, it is advantageous to make the main strike along the seacoast in order to cut off the main enemy grouping from its naval

bases and, with strikes along several axes, to split up the main grouping and destroy it in detail.

There are various possible ways of combining the methods of conducting operations given above. For instance, the immediate task can be fulfilled by encirclement actions and the subsequent task by an offensive along several often separated axes. The opposite is also possible: strikes along several axes at the beginning and then encirclement, etc.

In all cases, the basis of routing enemy forces will be, first of all, the use of fire means and then the use of a strike force of tank and motorized rifle troops, i.e., hitting the enemy with artillery fire and air strikes at first, and then completing the rout of his forces by the rapid actions of tank and motorized rifle troops in conjunction with the use of airborne assault landings. The massing of forces and means along the chosen axes remains an indispensable condition. However, here it is necessary to take into account that the capabilities of conventional weapons are limited in both range and effectiveness by comparison with nuclear weapons. Thus, for example, front bomber aviation is capable of delivering mass and group strikes to a depth of 350 to 450 kilometers, and fighter-bomber aviation--to a depth of 150 to 250 kilometers, i.e., they are capable of action against enemy troops of the first echelon and reserves of an army group. The main mass of artillery can hit enemy targets to a depth of fifteen to eighteen kilometers, but only a small part of it can hit beyond twenty kilometers. The limited capabilities of conventional means of destruction make necessary a subsequent routing of enemy groupings both along the front and in depth.

The subsequent routing of the enemy in depth consists of the following: first, routing large units of the enemy's first echelon through the actions of established strike groupings of the troops of the front (army) in conjunction with air strikes on the chosen axes of advance, and then exploiting the success attained for the destruction of enemy groupings within the operational depth. For these purposes, strong strike groupings of troops must be established on the axes of the strikes. The art of establishing them consists of being able--with slight overall superiority (or even a

lesser quantity of forces)--to create an overwhelming superiority over the enemy along the axis of the main strike, which would make it possible from the very beginning of the advance to split his main forces, to force him to conduct combat actions under conditions unfavorable to him, moving forward on his flanks and into his rear, and to thwart his attempts to establish a solid front of resistance and go over to positional forms of combat.

To achieve success, the front must rout the enemy's forces decisively along the axis of the main strike in a considerable sector (on the order of forty to fifty kilometers), knocking out of his grouping several divisions at once. In order to successfully carry out such a strike, it will be required to establish a grouping which would be appreciably superior to the enemy in artillery, tanks, and motorized rifle subunits and would have a sufficient degree of air support and strong antiaircraft defense. In concentrating forces and means, there must be exceptional effectiveness, and a high degree of organization in the work of commanders and staffs of formations will be required, since one must not forget the danger of the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy.

The use of airborne assault landings is important for the rapid rout of enemy groupings. They will establish centers of combat activity in the enemy's rear, attack him from unexpected directions, and thus force him to disperse the efforts of his troops.

In doing research on the problems of conducting operations without the use of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to pay particular attention to working out methods for the destruction or seizure of the enemy's nuclear means while at the same time ensuring the survivability of our nuclear forces and means and their constant readiness for immediate delivery of surprise strikes. One must seek ways of increasing the reliability of neutralizing enemy fire with conventional weapons and, above all, ways of effectively destroying his antitank defense means, especially on those axes where it is planned to use large tank groupings. It is also very important to work out in detail the problems of seizing industrial areas and large population centers (cities), bearing in mind in doing so that the main groupings of the advancing troops must not get

involved in drawn-out battles for cities but should seize them from the march, not allowing the enemy to establish a stable defense.

In a war using only conventional means of destruction, defense will also be put into practice more often than in a nuclear war, since under such conditions there are more possibilities to use its advantages for inflicting destruction on superior forces of the enemy. Furthermore, it is necessary to establish a great superiority over the enemy in forces and means for the successful conduct of offensive operations in non-nuclear warfare; this cannot be achieved along all axes, especially considering the possibility of a transition to nuclear actions.

The basic method of conducting defensive operations under such conditions is to successively inflict destruction on advancing enemy groupings with air strikes and with fire from artillery, tanks, and incendiary means and other conventional means, in conjunction with a firm holding of the most important lines (areas) and a wide use of obstacles, and also with the carrying out of counterattacks and counterstrikes. The extensive maneuvering of fire, antitank means, second echelons, reserves, and obstacles to build up efforts on threatened axes will have great importance for the success of the defense. Considering everything that has been said, operational art evidently should continue researching and working out of the problems of laying out a defense with limited means and must seek the most advantageous methods of organizing it with the use of fortified areas and obstacles.

Recently, statements by bourgeois military theoreticians on the possibility of conducting operations with a limited use of nuclear weapons are appearing more and more often in the West. In this case, as Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov noted, our actions must be flexible. It may be that under such conditions we will deliver nuclear strikes against the enemy with operational-tactical means only, while under other conditions part of the strategic nuclear means will be used with them simultaneously. Finally, it is not excluded that we will immediately deliver a general nuclear attack.

What may be characteristic during the conduct of operations with a limited use of nuclear weapons in some period of a war?

It appears to us that there will be much in common between the methods of actions with limited and unlimited use of these weapons, and at the same time there will be substantial differences. Everything will depend on what weapons are used and on what scale. If one considers that tactical, operational-tactical, and possibly also, in part, strategic nuclear weapons will be used in a limited war, then, obviously, the scale of the use of nuclear weapons and the targets of strikes will be limited only by the boundaries of the theater of military operations.

In this case, the nature and methods of the conduct of operations will have much in common with operations conducted under conditions of unlimited use of nuclear weapons. If only tactical nuclear weapons are used, then the depth and degree of effect on the enemy will change sharply. Under such conditions, his groupings can be routed successively through the extensive massing and use of conventional means of mass destruction. It must be said that these matters, as well as the possibility, itself, of conducting operations with a limited use of nuclear weapons, are still being subjected to detailed research.

In conclusion, we would like to turn attention to one more very important matter which operational art as a science cannot fail to take into consideration. We are talking about the political and morale state of the troops, which in nuclear war is a most important factor characterizing their combat effectiveness, since, in the final analysis, the tasks in an operation are fulfilled by people who have mastered weapons and equipment to perfection. This is why we have always proceeded and do still proceed from the fact that the high political and morale state of the troops, their stability, steadfastness, deep faith in the rightness of their cause, hatred for enemies, and high standard of combat (field) training have been and will be the primary basis of success in achieving victory over the enemy. These qualities of our troops acquire a special meaning under the conditions of modern warfare.

Party-political work carried on among the troops both in peacetime and in wartime, plays a most important role in instilling high combat and morale qualities. The main emphasis in Party-political work should be directed toward: instilling in all personnel of large units and units boundless devotion to the cause of Communism, devotion to the Motherland and one's own people, hatred for the enemy, whole-hearted selflessness, iron will, invincible persistence, steadfastness, and a striving to conquer the enemy regardless of any difficulties; and ensuring a high combat readiness of the troops for successful fulfilment of combat tasks under all possible conditions of the initiation and conduct of a war. The fulfilment of these and other tasks of Party-political work is a most important job, not only of the Party-political apparatus, but also of all command and supervisory personnel of units, large units, and formations.